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1. Introduction 
The president of the European Commission has always 
played a key role in the political system of the Europe-
an Union (EU) and the larger process of European inte-
gration (Spence, 2006, p. 27). However, while “the in-
cumbent is not able to fulfill the manifold functions 
attributed to him without exercising political leader-
ship, [the institutional structure of the, H.M.] presiden-
cy is not designed to exercise such leadership” (Drake, 
2000, p. 11; Kassim, 2013a, p. 1; Kassim et al., 2013, 
pp. 156, 160, 178; Tömmel, 2013, p. 789). In fact, it has 
ever since been an institutionally weak office. None-
theless, scholars have observed a “strengthening of the 
Presidency since 2005” especially inside the Commis-
sion and that “the powers of the presidency 
have…come to match the importance of the office” 
(Kassim, 2013a, p. 3; Kassim, 2013b, p. 1; Kassim et al., 
2013, p. 152). The presidency thus seems to be more 
powerful institutionally than ever before in European 
integration. In both acknowledging and qualifying this 
academic enthusiasm, the paper’s aims are twofold.  
First, it determines to what extent the institutional 
position of the office did actually change after the lat-
est EU Treaty, namely the Lisbon Treaty of 2009. In this 
regard, the analysis reveals that the office’s strong for-
malization inside the Commission had only very limited 
effects on the office’s political power vis-à-vis other EU 
institutions, but was in fact an attempt to bring the of-
fice in line with increased institutional constraints. As a 
second step, the paper substantiates this claim by ana-
lyzing the leadership performance of José Barroso in 
comparison to his famous predecessor Jacques Delors 
through one of the office’s key demands, the provision 
of public leadership in the European public spheres. The 
paper draws on theories of politicization of international 
organizations, which assume that the public visibility of 
an office increases alongside its institutional strength-
ening. Its analysis demonstrates that the office’s latest 
formalization did not substantially increase the presi-
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dent’s political role and authority at the European level 
(De Wilde & Zürn, 2012, pp. 149-150; Rauh & Zürn, 
2014, p. 126; Zürn, 2013, pp. 19, 32).  
2. The European Commission Presidency: What Kind 
of Leadership Potential? 
Political leadership “is an essentially inter-personal 
process…between the leader (or leaders) and a set of 
followers within a particular group context”, in which 
the leader obtains greater attention and influence, but 
only if followers let them do so (Ahlquist & Levi, 2011, 
p. 5; Elgie, 2015, p. 26; Keohane, 2010, p. 53). Under-
stood as this reciprocal-dynamic interaction, then, po-
litical leadership in executive offices does not only de-
pend on the institutional structure of the office 
(positional leadership), but equally involves the incum-
bent’s agency to lead (behavioral leadership) (Elgie, 
2015, p. 27; Helms, 2005, pp. 19-20; Helms, 2016, p. 6). 
Regarding this agency-structure duality, scholars ar-
gued that “the more the power is concentrated in the 
hands of an individual leader (structure), the greater 
the influence of that leader’s personality and prefer-
ences (agency)” (Byman & Pollack, 2001, p. 140; Elgie, 
1995, p. 204). 
However, the opposite is also equally true. Applying 
the agency-structure duality to the supranational level 
of the European Union, this article argues that the 
weaker the institutional structure of an office, here the 
Commission presidency, the more the provision of po-
litical leadership by its incumbents depends on their 
personal agency. In this sense, the argument does not 
simply “recogniz[e] the importance of individuals” in in-
ternational relations, but paradoxically still holds them 
paramount when it comes to political leadership in the 
European Union (Byman & Pollack, 2001, p. 145; Helms, 
2016, p. 5; Ross, 1995, p. 27; Spence, 2006, p. 27). 
2.1. Presidential Leadership Functions 
In accordance with the EU Commission’s main func-
tions (EUR-Lex, 2007, Art. 9 D/1), its president aims to 
fulfill three concrete leadership demands: agenda-
setting leadership, mediative-institutional leadership 
and public leadership (Cini, 1996, pp. 36-37; Curtin, 
2009, pp. 62-63; Endo, 1999, pp. 26, 63-64; Tömmel, 
2013, p. 790; Wille, 2013, pp. 61, 64; Kassim et al., 
2013, p. 164; Peterson, 1999, p. 48). Combining these 
three distinct functions, active political leadership in 
supranational organizations is understood as the ca-
pacity “to attempt and succeed in going beyond institu-
tional constraints, thereby expanding and creating re-
sources and opportunities” in order to influence and 
achieve mutually desired, publicly supported political 
goals over a certain period of time (Endo, 1999, pp. 26, 
28; Greenstein, 1992, p. 109; Tömmel, 2013, p. 790; 
Peterson, 1999, p. 48). Successful Commission presi-
dents thus strategically transfer political ambitions of 
Pan-European scope into consensual agendas (agenda-
setting leadership). These can then be effectively me-
diated through the intra- and inter-institutional arenas 
of decision-making at the European level (meditative-
institutional leadership) and gain support among Euro-
pean public spheres (public leadership). 
According to the Rome Treaty, the Commission 
“shall promote the general interest of the Union and 
take appropriate initiatives to that end” (EUR-Lex, 
1957, Art. 155; EUR-Lex, 2007, Art. 9 D/1). As its first 
representative, the Commission president has here al-
ways sought to provide political guidance and formu-
late the strategic goals of the Commission and the un-
ion more broadly (Curtin, 2009, p. 91; Peterson, 1999, 
p. 47). Political agenda-setting means to make choices 
“over the relative salience of individual dossiers, judg-
ments as to their relative merits, efforts to get pro-
posals into a shape in which they can be negotiated 
and…assess[ed] of their acceptability by the Council 
[and the Parliament, H.M.]” (Curtin, 2009, p. 74; Pol-
lack, 1997, p. 102; Princen, 2009, p. 19). In seeking to 
ensure “policy expertise and institutional persistence”, 
Commission presidents strategically invest in and prior-
itize the political agendas of the Commission in con-
junction with the College of Commissioners, the Euro-
pean Council and Parliament more broadly (Kassim, 
2013a, p. 14; Peterson, 1999, p. 48; Pollack, 1997, pp. 
102, 121). While the Rome Treaty left many “unknown 
or ‘grey’ areas”, much depended on the presidents and 
their College “to prioritize the issues and thus clarify the 
future agendas of the Community” (Endo, 1999, p. 38). 
The Amsterdam and Nice Treaties assigned this 
agenda-setting function to the president in a more offi-
cial fashion: “The Commission shall work under the po-
litical guidance of its president…” (EUR-Lex, 1992/2002, 
Art. 219/217). Taking into account the Commission’s 
right of initiative within the EU institutional framework, 
the treaties clearly enhanced the president’s potential 
to set political agendas and provide “policy leadership” 
(Kassim, Connolly, Dehousse, Rozenberg, & Bendjabal-
lah, 2016, p. 7). However, while the Lisbon Treaty rein-
vigorated the president’s pre-eminence vis-à-vis com-
missioners, it left out the small but significant word 
“political”. It states: “The President shall lay down 
guidelines within which the Commission is to work” 
(EUR-Lex, 2007, Art. 9D/6(a)). Whereas the office’s 
managerial functions were repeated—to “decide on 
the internal organization of the Commission, ensuring 
that it acts consistently, efficiently and as a collegiate 
body” (EUR-Lex, 2002, Art. 217/1, 2007, Art. 9D/6(b))—
its political function has again grown vague. Therefore, 
although the demand to provide political agenda-
setting leadership has been essential to the Commis-
sion presidency throughout the process of European 
integration, the Lisbon Treaty still leaves room for mul-
tiple interpretations. 
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The European Union is a polycentric system in 
which the Commission presidency holds the key inter-
mediary position. Its incumbent is the only actor who 
participates equally in all three major arenas of policy 
formulation and decision-making as a member and first 
representative of the College of Commissioners, the 
European Council (even without voting rights), and 
through regular participation in plenary sessions of the 
European Parliament. No other individual political posi-
tion can so self-evidently move across of all these three 
arenas. Therefore, it is not only essential for the in-
cumbent to invest in consensus-building to meet 
his/her leadership potential; the office itself plays a 
central mediating role in the EU’s inter-institutional 
framework (Cini, 2005, p. 7; Endo, 1999, p. 37; Peter-
son, 1999, p. 48). In other words, convincing member 
states and the Parliament’s political groups of a certain 
agenda is both process and substance of successful 
leadership by Commission presidents. Although the 
treaties only indirectly provide for the mediative func-
tion (EUR-Lex, 2007, Art. 9D/1 + 9D/6 (a-c), 9B/2), the 
institutional structure shows that such leadership is at 
the core of the office (Endo, 1999, p. 37). 
To help build compromises in the three different EU 
arenas, the president does not only need to express to 
other players what needs to be done but, more im-
portantly, how it can be done. For this the president 
requires administrative-procedural and technocratic 
expertise to provide solutions at the legal-procedural 
level (Curtin, 2009, pp. 61, 99). The Lisbon Treaty, and 
the Nice Treaty before it, vests the president with the 
previously mentioned power over the Commission 
(EUR-Lex, 2007, Art. 9 D/6 (b)). However, administra-
tive-procedural expertise does not just consist of effec-
tively running an organization. It also includes perspec-
tives on (re-)organizing administrative processes, thus 
attempting “to expand institutional resources [and] lift-
ing institutional constraints” (Endo, 1999, p. 36; Peter-
son, 1999, p. 48). As a consequence, political mediation 
and technocratic expertise are two sides of the same 
coin. The first refers to the political sphere of initiating, 
negotiating and agreeing on what needs to be done 
politically. The latter points to the procedural side of 
this process, namely offering insight into how political 
initiation and agreement can be realized and imple-
mented properly. In terms of leadership functions, 
these two demands can be subsumed under mediative-
institutional leadership. 
Finally, the president aims to (re-)present the 
Commission and the union more broadly. In this sense, 
s/he does not only represent the Commission and de-
fend its influence and prestige but also serves as pro-
moter of the ‘community interest’ both in the Europe-
an and international public spheres. The Lisbon Treaty 
states more explicitly than the Nice Treaty that the 
Commission “shall ensure the Union’s external repre-
sentation” (EUR-Lex, 2007, 9 D/1); however, it remains 
vague on the matter of the presidency. The link be-
tween the Commission president and the European 
public spheres is still less strong than that between na-
tional leaders and their constituencies. Yet the incum-
bent is nonetheless accountable and responsive to the 
European public, especially following the 2014 Europe-
an elections. As occupant of one of the highest Euro-
pean public offices, the Commission president relies on 
a positive image in the public sphere to steer and main-
tain political support (Tömmel, 2008, p. 140; Wille, 
2013, pp. 89, 91). This function, of not only represent-
ing the Commission technically, but also creating public 
attention and support for the Commission’s agenda 
and European issues more broadly, can be identified as 
public leadership.  
2.2. Institutional Resources and Constraints 
While the functions of an office are linked to its legal-
procedural structure, the presidency’s institutional re-
sources and constraints to provide political leadership 
confirm the mixed picture presented above. Since the 
Rome Treaty, the appointment of Commission presi-
dents has undergone enormous changes: From nomi-
nating the president by the Council in 1957 to electing 
him/her in the European parliamentary elections 
through top-candidates of the European political 
groups in 2014. While it was the member states’ pre-
rogative to appoint the College of Commissioners and 
its president unanimously (EUR-Lex, 1957, Art. 158), 
the Maastricht Treaty (1992) enhanced the role of the 
European Parliament as a consultative organ in the 
nomination process (Endo, 1999, p. 70; Nugent, 2001, 
p. 62). Since 1995, the Treaty also provides the presi-
dent with limited influence on the nomination of 
commissioners (Nasshoven, 2011, p. 87). Meanwhile, 
the president-elect and the nominated College have 
become subject to a vote of approval by the Parliament 
before being officially appointed by the Council (EUR-
Lex, 1992, Art. 158: 2), which is why the Commission’s 
investiture procedure had also been aligned to the Eu-
ropean elections (Nugent, 2001, p. 45). 
However, both the Nice and Lisbon Treaties changed 
this procedure in profound fashion. First, the European 
Council aims at nominating the president by a qualified 
majority instead of unanimity (EUR-Lex, 2007, Art. 17). 
This change offers more dynamism in choosing a presi-
dent, as the selection cannot be blocked by a member 
state anymore, which most likely avoids ‘lowest-
common denominator’ nominations (Nasshoven, 2011, 
pp. 89-90). Second, the candidate needs to be elected by 
the Parliament before the selection of the College, rep-
resenting the Parliament’s political majority after the 
latest European elections (Wille, 2013, p. 63). Third, the 
president-elect and the nominated College are subject 
to hearings and finally a parliamentary vote. In addition, 
the Parliament has a veto right against the nominated 
 Politics and Governance, 2016, Volume 4, Issue 2, Pages 68-79 71 
College, and in 2013 decided to nominate their own top-
candidates (Spitzenkandidaten) for the Commission 
presidency in the 2014 elections (Kassim, 2016, pp. 2-3). 
On the one part, this increased reliance on the European 
Parliament aims at expanding the political legitimacy of 
the Commission president and increasing his/her politi-
cal influence and public visibility. On the other, this new 
dependence on party-political directions also poses a 
threat to the president’s political independence and the 
Commission’s function of representing the Union’s 
common interest (Kassim, 2016, p. 5). In addition, alt-
hough the president might have been elected by a ma-
jority of MEPs, s/he cannot necessarily count on this ma-
jority during his/her term since faction or coalition 
compliance do not exist in the EP. Finally, the concurrent 
political dependence on two powerful but antagonistic 
institutions, the Parliament and the Council, poses a cru-
cial challenge to actually provide leadership at all.  
Moreover, the Lisbon Treaty introduced two further 
high-level EU positions, which weaken the Commission 
president’s agenda-setting potential, mediation powers 
and his/her public visibility (Christiansen, 2012, pp. 
230, 237; Tömmel, 2015, p. 9). For one part, there is 
the permanent president of the European Council who, 
by “chairing and driving forward [the Council’s] work” 
(EUR-Lex, 2007, Art. 9 B/6(a)) potentially limits the 
Commission president’s prerogative of mediating in the 
Council, promoting the Union’s general interest, and 
thus also reducing the Commission president’s agenda-
setting influence (Curtin, 2009, p. 77; Dinan, 2013, pp. 
1258, 1262-1263). Before 2009, the Commission presi-
dent developed the Council’s agenda together with the 
rotating Council presidency and thus had a much more 
direct access to member states (Endo, 1999, p. 60). In 
addition, due to the Council’s rotation, the Commission 
president also had a generally more pronounced over-
view over current European affairs than individual 
heads of government and state. However, the perma-
nent Council president now holds this key position of 
direct access to the rotating presidency, and this con-
strains the Commission president’s opportunities to in-
fluence Council proceedings (Tömmel, 2015, pp. 13, 
18-19, 21-22). For example, the close relationship that 
existed between Commission president Jacques Delors, 
German chancellor Helmut Kohl and French president 
François Mitterrand during the 1980s, would be much 
more difficult to obtain today with the permanent 
Council president intervening between the two sides 
(Dinan, 2013, p. 1266; Endo, 1999, pp. 62-63). For an-
other, the High Representative of the Common Foreign 
and Security Policy (CFSP) who by “ensur[ing] the con-
sistency of the Union’s external action[s]” (EUR-Lex, 
2007, Art. 9E/4) also diminishes the president’s inter-
national visibility even if s/he is not formally assigned 
to the CFSP (Barber, 2010, p. 59). 
Inside the Commission, the main constraint arises 
from the requirement that each member state still del-
egates one commissioner (EUR-Lex, 1957, Art. 157). 
The Lisbon Treaty aimed at diminishing the number of 
commissioners “corresponding to two thirds of the 
number of Member States” (EUR-Lex, 2007, Art. 9 D/5). 
However, despite this, the European Council in May 
2013 decided to continue the former practice until the 
accession of the 30th member state (European Council, 
2013). Thus the Commission president is confronted 
with commissioners of 27 different nationalities and po-
litical backgrounds (Döring, 2007, pp. 224-225; Egeberg, 
2006, p. 11; Smith, 2003, p. 142). The president is pro-
vided with the right to influence the selection process of 
commissioners and distributes portfolios among them. 
Nonetheless conflicting relationships may arise concern-
ing policies, competences, portfolios, and personalities 
(Döring, 2007, p. 224; Endo, 1999, pp. 78, 81; Spence, 
2006, p. 55). Yet the principle of one commissioner per 
member state also increases the legitimacy of the 
Commission to provide European-wide policy solutions. 
Moreover, the president may still benefit from the in-
crease in commissioners, since a larger number may 
prevent any single commissioner from building his/her 
own power base inside the Commission.  
Another ambivalent intra-institutional constraint 
potentially emerges from the College’s principle of col-
legiality (RoP [1963]/2000, Art. 1). Whereas this princi-
ple once represented a key source of legitimacy for the 
Commission’s actions, it has become increasingly diffi-
cult to apply it to an ever-expanding organization. The 
latest treaty revisions clearly enhanced the president’s 
role (EUR-Lex, 2007, Art. 9D/6(a)); still, the College of 
Commissioners represents a group of politically high-
profile and quite independent individuals (Spence, 
2006, pp. 38-39; Stevens & Stevens, 2001, p. 222). Even 
with a stronger hierarchy of seven vice presidents 
among them, as introduced by Jean-Claude Juncker in 
2014, the president can neither rely on a formal coali-
tion agreement, nor does s/he decide independently 
on the composition of the College or make use of a 
stronger voting power than the other commissioners 
(Cini, 2005, p. 2; Kassim, 2016, p. 7; Kassim et al., 2013, 
p. 156). However, apart from these institutional con-
straints, the Lisbon Treaty also provided the office with 
some legal-procedural resources, especially within the 
Commission, through the requirement to once again 
adopt its own Rules of Procedure (RoP) (EUR-Lex, 2007, 
Art. 249; European Commission, 2010). The term “politi-
cal guidance” did disappear from the Lisbon Treaty, but 
was reintroduced in the amended RoP of 2010. These 
rules permit the president to “lay down the political 
guidelines within which the Commission shall exercise its 
functions…, [and] steer the work of the Commission in 
order to ensure it is carried out” (European Commis-
sion, 2010, Art. 3 (1)). It can, however, be debated 
whether it is more significant to refer to “political guid-
ance” in the Treaty or in the Commission’s internal 
Rules of Procedure. 
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While the Rome Treaty already permitted the pres-
ident to convene, share, and set the College’s agenda, 
today the rules are also formulated that only the secre-
tary-general and the president’s head of cabinet are al-
lowed to attend College meetings, privileging the pres-
ident vis-à-vis other commissioners (Endo, 1999, p. 40; 
Kassim et al., 2013, p. 156, 2016, p. 8; Nugent, 2001, p. 
68; European Commision, 2010, Art. 10 (1)). This ex-
emption equally applies to the modification of proposi-
tions, the restructuring of the agenda, and the signing 
of minutes (European Commission, 2010, Art. 6 (5); Art. 
11 (2)). In addition, the president is not only vested with 
the right to distribute Commission portfolios during the 
investiture procedure. S/he can also reshuffle them later 
during the term, demanding resignations by commis-
sioners (except for the High Representative), as well as 
creating and controlling portfolios added to his/her own 
responsibilities (EUR-Lex, 2002, Art. 217 (4), 2007, Art. 9 
D/6 c; European Commission, 2010, Art. 3/6, Art. 22).  
Finally, two further resources emerge from the 
president’s cabinet and the Commission’s Secretariat-
General. Since the early days of the Commission, the 
president has always had more advisers and personal 
staff than other commissioners, allowing for the oppor-
tunity to influence and modify the Commission’s agen-
da at the Cabinet’s working level (Kassim et al., 2013, p. 
156; Stevens & Stevens, 2001, p. 235). In addition, the 
RoPs’ latest amendments have officially elevated the 
Secretariat-General from an executive secretary of the 
Commission to a rather “political body” working for the 
president providing him/her with substantial up-
streaming power inside the Commission (Endo, 1999, 
p. 41; Kassim, 2013a, pp. 14-15; Kassim et al., 2016, pp. 
7-8; European Commission, 2010, Art. 20 (1)). Conse-
quently, while many of the institutional resources have 
been available to the president since the first Commis-
sion took office, only relatively few, though essential, 
resources have been added since the latest treaty 
amendments were made. 
2.3. The Leadership Potential of the Commission 
President  
The analysis of the Lisbon Treaty and certain sections 
of the Commission’s Rules of Procedure demonstrated 
that neither the political functions of the Commission 
presidency nor its legal-procedural resources were 
substantially altered or strengthened by the latest revi-
sions. Despite introducing a paragraph dedicated to the 
office, the Lisbon Treaty remains relatively vague as to 
the office’s political leadership functions. Moreover, 
the creation of new EU positions substantially chal-
lenges the Commission president’s potential for agen-
da-setting, inter-institutional mediation and public visi-
bility at the European level. All in all, the Treaty hardly 
made the office more powerful in its political functions. 
The same applies to the office’s legal-procedural re-
sources. Although the president now officially deter-
mines the internal organization of the Commission, 
mainly through the Commission’s Rules of Procedure, 
many of these “new” rights have been used since the 
very first Commission took office. In fact, apart from 
the closer, though important, alignment of the Secre-
tariat-General to the power resources of the Commis-
sion presidency, the Lisbon Treaty did not substantially 
extend the office’s institutional powers. It rather 
aligned them with its increased constraints regarding 
the Commission’s expansion (Christiansen, 2012, p. 
237; Curtin, 2009, p. 74; Tömmel, 2008, pp. 120-121). 
In conclusion, the formalization of the office, based 
mainly on managerial-organizational changes inside the 
Commission, does not automatically imply more politi-
cal leadership on the part of the Commission president. 
The institutional structure is still a mixed picture for 
the Commission president. The balance of resources 
and constraints has remained relatively stable over the 
course of European integration with generally weak in-
stitutional opportunities to fulfill the leadership de-
mands, especially in the inter-institutional realm. This 
means that increased resources inside the Commission, 
have been relatively neutralized by increased institu-
tional constraints both in- and outside the Commission. 
To extend Kassim’s words, it was not just “Hallstein and 
Delors [who] relied on personal standing and authori-
ty” and their own strategic choices to tackle the office’s 
institutional constraints and provide political leader-
ship; Barroso’s power and those of present and future 
presidents—despite latest treaty revisions—remains all 
in all still more reliant on personal capacities than “the 
constitutional strengthening of the office” (Kassim, 
2013a, p. 16; Kassim et al., 2013, p. 174). 
3. The Leadership Performance of José Barroso 
To observe these personal challenges of balancing 
strong political demands with weak institutional pow-
ers, it is worth analyzing the public performances of 
Commission presidents. The literature on EU politiciza-
tion suggests that increased authority of supranational 
institutions due to treaty revisions leads to an increase 
of media attention in the European public spheres on 
said institutions (De Wilde & Zürn, 2012, pp. 149-150; 
Rauh, 2014, pp. 2, 4; Rauh & Zürn, 2014, pp. 125-126; 
Zürn, 2013, pp. 13, 15, 19).1 Following this line of argu-
ment, and hypothesizing that the Lisbon Treaty would 
have strengthened the presidency (in contrast to the 
findings of the previous section), public attention on, 
for example, José Barroso, Commission president be-
                                                          
1 Politicization means the transfer of a decision/institution into 
the realm of politics, increasing public attention on it, in terms 
of increased salience and polarization, as well as the mobiliza-
tion of new resources to match the increased attention (Rauh 
& Zürn, 2014, pp. 125-126). 
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tween 2004–14, would have most likely increased after 
the coming-into-force of said treaty in 2009.  
To verify this assumption, a theory of candidate-
media agenda convergence is applied to study the pub-
lic performance of José Barroso. In addition, a cursory 
comparison to his predecessor Jacques Delors, Com-
mission president between 1985–95, who is often re-
garded as the pinnacle of leadership success for Com-
mission presidents, is drawn to further strengthen the 
argument (Brummer, 2014; Hayes, 2008, pp. 135-136, 
143, 2010, pp. 595-596; Kassim et al., 2013; Tömmel, 
2013). In doing so, Barroso’s and Delors’ speeches, and 
the topics they addressed, are compared with the is-
sues they were associated with in newspaper articles. 
The strength of this overlap between the presidents’ 
topics and the issues they were related to in the media 
is then understood as an indicator of their capacity to 
provide public leadership at the European level. This 
assumes that the more concentrated the manner in 
which the issues were addressed, the more likely they 
were to be covered by the media (Hayes, 2008, pp. 
135-136, 143, 2010, pp. 595-596). The British Financial 
Times (FT), one of the prime newspapers which covers 
EU-related topics for a Pan-European readership, 
serves as exemplary media source.2 The following sec-
tion systematically compares the main topics of Barro-
so’s 588 speeches and Delors’ 265 speeches with the 
174 FT articles covering Barroso between 2004–14, and 
                                                          
2 For a similar methodological approach see Kurpas et al. (2008). 
the 312 articles reporting on Delors between 1985–95.3 
3.1. The Public Impact of Presidential Speeches 
The distribution of speeches and newspaper articles al-
ready provides some contradictory results as both fol-
low different cyclic developments (Figure 1). Barroso 
started with a lower number of speeches at the begin-
ning of each term (on average 30.5 speeches p.a. be-
tween 2004–5 and 2009–10), reaching the highest fre-
quency of speeches in mid-term (compare 75 and 82 
speeches in 2008 and 2011 respectively). The end of 
each term in office (2009 and 2014) is then character-
ized again by lower numbers of speeches, 40 and 45 
respectively.4 However, the newspaper articles invert  
                                                          
3 The speeches were retrieved from the Archives of the Euro-
pean Commission in Brussels (Delors), and the website of the 
European Commission (Barroso) (European Commission, 
2014a, 2014b). The dataset of speeches consists of full speech-
es given at public or semi-public conferences, opening speech-
es and keynote addresses, detailed or closing remarks and in-
terventions. The FT articles were retrieved from the FT digital 
archive and the LexisNexis database. Both databases were sys-
tematically consulted for articles in which the term “Delors” or 
“Barroso” was mentioned in either the headline or as a subtitle 
for the respective period. 
4 The low number of speeches in 2006 (22) can be interpreted 
as an outlier due to a low retrieval from the European Commis-
sion database for this year. 
 
Figure 1. Correlation of presidential speeches and FT articles (1985–95, 2004–14). 
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this pattern. Although the FT increased its coverage of 
Barroso during 2004 and 2005, with a total of 41 arti-
cles, it did not follow Barroso’s strong outreach strate-
gy in the years 2007 and 2008; it in fact decreased its 
coverage even further compared to 2005. Only during 
Barroso’s reappointment in 2009 did the FT again in-
crease its reporting, reaching its second highest point 
of coverage with 27 articles. Although Barroso gave 
most speeches of his incumbency in 2011/12, the FT’s 
reporting on Barroso decreased even further, thus re-
maining lower than during his first term (with 11 articles 
on average during 2010–14). Despite slight increases in 
coverage in 2008/9 and 2011, Barroso was thus general-
ly not able to draw public media attention to his political 
agenda by increasing his public outreach efforts. In fact, 
during his second term, media coverage was even lower 
than in the first term (114 and 60 articles respectively), 
although he had delivered more speeches in his second 
term (262 and 326 speeches respectively). 
Comparing these results to the public media per-
formance of Jacques Delors, it becomes even more ap-
parent that Barroso was largely unsuccessful in steer-
ing and focusing public attention onto himself despite 
increased public exposure (Figure 1). Across 1985-95, 
Jacques Delors gave about 265 speeches, making a par-
ticularly ‘strong outreach push’ at the beginning of 
each of his terms, which were covered by the Financial 
Times with an overall amount of 312 articles. As the 
graphs reveal, the FT’s coverage was not only higher in 
absolute terms than Delors’ outreach, but also nearly 
symmetrically covered Delors’ public exposures. The 
theory of candidate-media agenda convergence argues 
that “public opinion [intends] to encourage conver-
gence [between] [politicians’] and media agendas”, 
since both tend to “alight on similar sets of topics [due 
to their, H.M.]…unwilling[ness] to focus on issues that 
lack public salience” (Hayes, 2010, pp. 595-596). As a 
result, “media appear generally responsive to themes 
emphasized by [politicians]” except when, for example, 
media do not acknowledge the authority of the politi-
cian in a particular area or disagree with the im-
portance of issues set by the politician (Hayes, 2010). 
In accordance with this argument, Delors’ results do 
not only confirm that a close symmetrical coverage of 
speeches and articles is possible. It also indicates a suc-
cessful outreach strategy, thereby showing that Delors’ 
success was not just caused by a positive context of his 
incumbency, but equally included his own strategies 
and leadership capacity. As for politicization theories of 
international organizations, the disparity between the 
higher FT coverage of fewer of Barroso’s speeches 
across his first term and more of his speeches gaining 
lower FT coverage in his second term also indicates 
that the Lisbon Treaty may indeed not have strength-
ened the office’s political and public authority, e.g. due 
to the creation of new EU high level positions. 
3.2. The Public Convergence of Presidential Speeches 
The second step evaluates to what extent Barroso and 
Delors were able to link their main political agendas to 
their presidencies in the public media. In his 588 
speeches, José Barroso addressed eight main topics in 
his central political agenda, which were apparent 
throughout his two terms to varying degrees of intensi-
ty.5 The first topic was growth, jobs, and innovation, in 
which Barroso sought to steer the political debate to-
wards new financial investments in order to stimulate 
European-wide economic growth, employment and 
technological innovation (Cini, 2005, pp. 5-6; Kassim et 
al., 2016, p. 13; Kurpas, Grøn, & Kaczyński, 2008, p. 19). 
With 21%, this main topic was the leading single issue 
of his political agenda throughout his presidency. The 
second essential point of Barroso’s agenda was Eu-
rope’s future and renewal capturing 14% of his main 
topics, while his third most important topic was global-
ization, which amounted to 12%. Fourth, the topic of 
European values, culture, citizens and civil society was 
another one of his central concerns (14%) (Cini, 2005, 
pp. 5-6). Addressed in a total of 61% in the category of 
main topics these four issues were central to his politi-
cal agenda and of continuous importance throughout 
his presidency. 
These agenda items were accompanied by four ad-
ditional main issues that were, characterized by greater 
fluctuation, due to a strong influence by inter-
nal/external political events at the European level. 
These four topics were, first, the Euro area including 
the institutions of Ecofin, EFSF and ESM (11%). Here, 
Barroso addressed most notably the financial govern-
ance of the Eurozone, which became particularly im-
portant in 2009, 2010 and 2011 at the height of the Eu-
ropean financial debt crisis and the economic and 
financial situation in Greece and other southern Euro-
pean states. Second, this topic was accompanied by 
more general elaborations about the EU single market 
and economic governance (9%), in which Barroso ar-
gued for a deeper economic and financial integration 
of the European Union. The third main topic was the 
                                                          
5 The content analysis of Barroso’s and Delors’ speeches and 
respective FT articles was conducted with the qualitative data 
analysis software MAXQDA. One speech/article may address 
more than one topic, but each topic was only coded once in a 
speech/article. The coding of speeches/articles followed an ex-
ploratory approach, guided by a set of four higher-ranking cat-
egories, which had been developed alongside the frequency, 
and as such the significance of topics. Speeches: (1) De-
lors’/Barroso’s main topics/political agenda, (2) general EC/EU 
issues, (3) EC/EU internal/external events, and (4) EC/EU poli-
cies. Articles: (1) Delors’/Barroso’s main topics, (2) general 
EC/EU issues, (3) EC/EU policies, (4) FT coverage of De-
lors/Barroso apart from their agenda. For the purpose of this 
paper only the categories concerning the presidents’ main top-
ics are being analyzed. 
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EU’s external cooperation and its partnerships (11%). 
Here, again, questions of globalization and internation-
al economic governance played an important role. Fi-
nally, Barroso also focused on climate change, envi-
ronment and sustainable development (8%). However, 
this topic decreased in significance after the 2009 UN 
climate summit in Copenhagen and the outbreak of the 
European sovereign debt crisis (Kassim et al., 2016, p. 
12; Schout & Buirma, 2014, p. 3).  
Comparing these results to those of Delors’ political 
agenda, a huge divide becomes apparent. First, alt-
hough Delors had also addressed around seven issues 
in the category of main topics over the course of his 
presidency (completion of the single market (14%), 
technological cooperation and innovation (10%), finan-
cial and monetary cooperation (21%), institutional 
functioning of the Community (16%), social dimension 
and social cohesion (18%), closer political cooperation 
and political union (10%), and finally external coopera-
tion (11%)), he addressed not more than five central 
topics at the same time. This is in line with studies of 
public opinion, which concluded that public spheres 
hardly focus on more than five issues at one time 
(Jones & Baumgartner, 2004, p. 2; Princen, 2009, p. 
20). In fact, Delors developed a strong thematic and 
dynamic overlap among his main topics, strategically 
interlocking each topic with the former one, the so-
called method of engrenage. These topics ranged from 
the completion of the single market (Single European 
Act, 1986/7) to stronger social cohesion (Community 
Charter of Fundamental Social Rights, 1988/9), and fi-
nally closer financial and monetary cooperation (Eco-
nomic and Monetary Union, 1992) (Drake, 2000, p. 14).  
Taking into account Delors’ success in setting Eu-
rope’s political agenda during his presidency (Endo, 
1999), the distribution of Barroso’s political agenda in-
dicates that, with eight broad main topics, Barroso’s 
agenda was continuously overloaded and thus in part 
diluted when compared to his predecessor. Second, 
the development of Barroso’s main topics suggests a 
two-pronged agenda strategy. On the one hand, he fo-
cused on his first four main topics in a way that was 
relatively independent of actual political develop-
ments. These four topics were characterized by strong 
generalizations, ones easily applicable to a broad range 
of political occasions. On the other, he followed politi-
cal developments at European level closely in an ad-
hoc reactive mode, e.g. climate change or the EU fi-
nancial system (Hodson, 2013, p. 303; Schout & 
Buirma, 2014, p. 6). However, while Barroso’s four con-
stant and four fluctuating main topics remained some-
what separate and detached from each other, it can be 
assumed that it was potentially more difficult for Bar-
roso’s audiences to actually identify his political priori-
ties and his main political agenda. The analysis of the 
Financial Times’ reporting on Barroso’s main topics 
confirms this assumption. 
The newspaper reported most notably on Barroso’s 
comments about the Euro/EMU/Ecofin/EFSF/ESM and 
the EU’s financial governance (at 26% in the coverage 
of Barroso’s main topics). In addition, the FT paid par-
ticular attention to Barroso when he announced and 
discussed matters of the EU single market/economic 
governance, as well as his central topic of 
growth/jobs/innovation/Lisbon Agenda (with 22% and 
18% respectively). The FT also reported frequently on 
two of Barroso’s other main topics (namely EU external 
cooperation/partnerships/development as well as cli-
mate change/environment/ecologic governance with 
17% and 12% respectively). This seems at first to be a 
good result in terms of a convergence between agenda 
and public coverage. Yet the reporting of the Financial 
Times nearly inverted the priority setting of Barroso’s 
agenda. Barroso put a strong focus on economic 
growth, the EU’s future, European values and globaliza-
tion (which made up to 61% of his main topics), less of-
ten addressing the more fluctuating main topics of the 
Eurozone as well as financial and economic govern-
ance, EU external cooperation and climate change 
(with only 39% in the overall distribution of main top-
ics). Conversely, however, the Financial Times covered 
these latter fluctuating topics far more often (with 77% 
in the overall coverage of Barroso’s main topics) than 
his four stable topics (23%) (Figure 2). As these findings 
illustrate, despite a general overlap between Barroso’s 
agenda-setting and FT coverage, the different priority 
settings and issue attention between José Barroso and 
the Financial Times are obvious. 
In contrast, the FT followed Delors’ agenda and pri-
ority setting much more closely (Figure 3). While Delors 
focused most notably on the topic of closer financial 
and monetary cooperation, the FT also covered this 
topic in the majority of its articles on Delors’ main top-
ics (39%), thereby even exceeding the frequency with 
which Delors had addressed this issue (21% of main 
topics). This indicates that Delors’ agenda items had 
become politicized to a significant degree (Drake, 2000, 
p. 51). Delors’ second, third and fourth main topics 
(completion of single market, social dimension and in-
stitutional functioning) were also covered by the news-
paper with largely the same priority setting (16%, 14% 
and 10% respectively). Finally, Delors’ three other main 
topics (technological cooperation, political cooperation 
and closer political cooperation and political union) 
were also covered roughly in accordance with his prior-
ity setting (6%, 10% and 5% respectively). Hence, a high 
thematic convergence and partially strong politiciza-
tion can be observed between the main topics of De-
lors’ speeches and the topics he was associated with in 
the FT. 
In summary, three major conclusions derive from 
analyzing the public convergence of presidential 
speeches. First, a general overlap between the topics 
addressed in the speeches and the topics Barroso was 
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Figure 2. FT coverage of Barroso’s main topics. 
 
Figure 3. FT coverage of Delors’ main topics. 
associated with in the Financial Times can be identi-
fied, though the newspaper featured them at a very 
different frequency and focus. Of his eight main topics, 
only two were frequently covered by the newspaper. 
Since the other main topics such as the EU’s future 
hardly constituted a substantive agenda, they were 
covered much less frequently by the newspaper. Alt-
hough Commission presidents usually represent the 
Commission’s collective mission and the union’s com-
mon interest, and therefore seek to address European 
issues in more general terms, rhetorical vagueness or 
commonplaces potentially threaten an incumbent’s se-
riousness and may thus have an adverse effect on 
his/her media coverage. In contrast to Delors’ strong 
convergence of thematic coverage, the Financial Times 
inverted the priority setting of Barroso’s main topics. 
As a result, Barroso largely failed in presenting and dis-
seminating his political agenda to the public spheres.  
Second, and taking cursorily into account the con-
text of Barroso’s presidency, it becomes apparent that 
even when Barroso’s media coverage was relatively 
high, it did not necessarily relate to his own contribu-
tions, but rather coincided with key events at the Eu-
ropean level. This becomes particularly evident in the 
FT’s coverage of Barroso in the years 2004/5, 2008, 
2009 and 2011, where his outreach efforts coincided 
with central events at the European level such as the 
Commission’s (re-)appointment, the international fi-
nancial crisis or the European sovereign debt crisis.  
Third, the sharp decrease in the FT’s coverage from 
Barroso’s first to his second term (although he had giv-
en more speeches) substantiates the assumption that 
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after 2009 Barroso’s public attention had been poten-
tially decreased by other EU offices. This indicates that 
the Lisbon Treaty has hardly strengthened the political 
powers and authority of the Commission presidency at 
the European level.  
4. Conclusion: What Kind of Leadership Prospect? 
The goal of this paper was twofold. First, it aimed to 
analyze the institutional role of the Commission presi-
dency and its legal-procedural powers before and after 
the Treaty of Lisbon came into force in an effort to 
evaluate the office’s political leadership potential. Sec-
ond, it sought to explore the public performance of the 
Commission president José Barroso in comparison to 
his successful predecessor Jacques Delors in order to 
further substantiate the article’s argument. In this re-
gard, Barroso’s and Delors’ public performances were 
analyzed by comparing the frequency and main topics 
of their speeches with their respective coverage in the 
newspaper Financial Times. Only one newspaper and 
one other incumbent, Jacques Delors, were used to il-
lustrate Barroso’s public performance and future anal-
ysis therefore needs further research on other news-
papers and presidents. Nonetheless, the study allows 
for two main conclusions which also clarify the office’s 
leadership prospect.  
First, with regard to theories of politicization in 
global governance, the FT’s sharply decreased cover-
age of José Barroso during his second term illustrates 
that the Lisbon Treaty may not have increased the po-
litical role of the Commission president at the suprana-
tional level. If the Treaty had significantly strengthened 
the office, more frequent coverage of the president 
would have been likely especially since Barroso dra-
matically increased his public exposure. However, the 
opposite was the case. In particular, the creation of 
two new EU offices potentially contributed to Barroso’s 
decreased media coverage. Second, while supranation-
al institutions can only make a significant impact on Eu-
ropean policy-making if they use “their formal powers 
and competences to a maximum”, this study demon-
strated that this ‘maximum’ still largely depends on the 
individual leading these institutions and his/her strate-
gic choices, which have to be redefined by each incum-
bent (Tömmel, 2014, p. 28). Barroso was thus far from 
offering “entrepreneurial or pre-eminent” leadership 
when it came to his public performance (Brummer, 
2014, p. 343; Kassim, 2013a, pp. 16, 18). 
In conclusion, since the Lisbon Treaty hardly in-
creased the office’s institutional powers especially in 
the EU’s inter-institutional realm, the prospect for the 
Commission presidency indicates that the exercise of 
its leadership functions still strongly relies on the in-
cumbent’s personal leadership capacities. In the words 
of Barber: “What the [Lisbon] treaty does not con-
tain,…is that vital ingredient for success—political will-
power” (Barber, 2010, p. 66). The strengthening of 
managerial-organizational functions alone does not au-
tomatically imply that actual political leadership is or 
can be provided. Otherwise Barroso’s public perfor-
mance would most likely have been stronger than that 
of Delors’. The predominant reliance on the disposi-
tions of individuals in supranational institutions indi-
cates a strong vulnerability as to whether they function 
effectively or not. The creation of supranational institu-
tions with relatively weak legal-procedural resources 
may indeed be in the interest of member states, since 
it safeguards their national sovereignty and control 
over major political developments at the European lev-
el. Yet it also hinders the institution’s actual effective-
ness. Weak institutional powers (structure) do not indi-
cate less, but paradoxically more dependence on the 
relatively unpredictable variable of individual capacities 
(agency) to successfully execute an office’s political 
leadership demands. Hence a strong reliance on indi-
viduals counterweighs the central aim of institution-
building, namely a stable exercise of power and the 
provision of continuity and predictability in decision-
making processes.  
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